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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Changes In the international arena often cone slowly, yet the last 
th irty  years have seen changes significant enough to a lter the entire 
course o f  international events* C onflict has always brought pain and 
death, but recent advances in m ilitary technology and the advent of 
nuclear weaponry have made war potentially  ever more devastating. 
C onflict management and avoidance have therefore become increasingly 
v ita l. The technological advances are as yet s t i l l  under the control o f 
nation-states, and it  is  the interaction o f these which is o f interest to 
the international analyst. The decision-making process o f sovereign 
states has become subject to closer scrutiny than ever, in search o f 
Increased opportunities for peaceful resolution o f c o n flic t .
In this lig h t, perhaps the most significant change o f late has 
been the sh ift to a bipolar world, which commenced between World War I and 
II and culminated in the Cold War. The development o f the United States 
as one o f  the two world powers has generated a considerable amount o f 
study as to how American policy-making occurs, but the research done on 
the other h a lf, the Soviet Union, has been far more lim ited. During the 
last few decades, the Soviet Union has developed "from the position  o f  a 
s tr ic t ly  regional power— though one with substantial m ilitary capab ilities  
and significant untapped potential to expand its  role in the world— to a
1
2major actor in a l l  areas of the international p o lit ic a l ,  security, and 
economic system."1 Relations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union are o f prime importance to a l l  people. These relations would be 
best managed in an atmosphere o f  trust. Although real trust may be too 
much to ask, a degree of understanding is  not. Trust cannot flourish in 
an atmosphere of fear, whether borne o f ignorance or of knowledge. It is 
the fear of the unknown with which this paper is mainly concerned. It is 
an attempt to shed light on how the Soviets arrive at their foreign policy 
decisions and how this process is  affected by crisis-induced stress. 
There cannot be too much discussion of this top ic , and indeed, there are 
at present numerous facets of t . area in need of further research.
There he' often been a temptation to portray the Soviet Union as a
monolith, with a single guiding principle behind its  actions. This narrow
outlook, frequently focusing on Bolshevik or Communist expansion, neglects
the diversity of inputs which necessarily a ffect any major decision-maker.
This outlook oversim plifies things in a hurried attempt to understand an
Issue that may forever remain somewhat elusive. David K. Shipler, quoting
Stephen F. Cohen o f Princeton University, suggests that among the
misperceptions created by this oversim plification  are the notions that,
"the Soviet e l it e  is u tterly monolithic because a ll  Communists think 
a lik e ," that "every Soviet leader is  strong," that "there is no real 
p o lit ic s  in the system—i t  is  a kind o f administrative despotism." 
This last perceptual problem stems partly from the public struggle 
between dissidents and the sta te , which creates an appearance o f 
p o lit ic s  while the real p o lit ic s ,  the jockeying among constituencies 
for resources and p r io r it ie s , takes place behind the closed doors o f 
Soviet officialdom .
Scholars have begun to consider the diversity of inputs into the 
decisional process. The emergence of a bureaucratic-politics model o f 
decision-making in the last few decades has signaled that "the trend has 
been away from single-factor explanations o f Soviet foreign policy  and
3toward an integration of a m ultiplicity  o f factors. The question has been 
rephrased. No longer is i t  'What factor is the key to the Russian
enigma?' Now we ask 'What is  the operational mix of the factors which
3
influence Soviet p o lic y ? '"  Analysis of the Soviet decision-making
process focuses on the dispersal of power among the various interest 
groups that are represented on the ruling body* the Politburo. There 
appears to be a good deal of parochial politick ing involved in Soviet 
debate on foreign a ffa ir s . It is  very important to understand that there 
are certain sim ilarities in the process whereby large bureaucracies arrive 
at major decisions. With this understanding, the other actors in the 
international arena may be better able to comprehend and even anticipate 
the directions of Soviet p o licy .
While this understanding is very useful in i t s e l f ,  it  becomes a 
necessity in the tense environment of a c r is is . When a nation 's basic 
values are threatened, its  a b ility  to maintain a consistent and calm 
decisional procedure l r Impaired. The manner in which the information 
flow 1b affected and how the speed and e ffic ien cy  of decisional groups 
(with a l l  the considerations postulated by the bureaucratic-politics 
model) may sh ift under the heightened stress of a c r is is  w ill a ffect the 
a b ility  o f the nation-state to remain in control o f  its  situation.. When 
the premise of a bureaucratic-politics model of decision-making is placed 
within the parameters o f r isk  and c r is is  behavior, i t  can be set against a 
documented event in an e ffo r t  to test its  explanatory and therefore 
predictive powers. The reform movement carried out by the Czechoslovak 
people and government in the spring o f 1968 and the subsequent Soviet 
invasion in August o f  the same year present a suitable example. By 
applying these theories o f Soviet behavior we are able to test the
4potential o f these fame theories as tools for understanding future Soviet 
international behavior.
CHAPTER 1J
Humans try In various ways to change their environment. Sometimes 
the results are as planned; more often they are not. But in any case, 
man's decision-making process can be subjected to analysis. An 
understanding of the decision-making process can be of great use for an 
Individual during Interaction with others* as this w ill fa c ilita te  his own 
decision-making process.
When the Importance of understanding the methods o f another is 
magnified to consider the co llective  responsib ilities of the nation state* 
it  becomes a l l  the more v ita l. As in any personal interactions* the 
interactions of nations with one another can only be aided by a degree of 
mutual understanding. When the procedures whereby a state reaches its  
decisions and the factors Influencing these decisions are understood by 
the states with which it  must interact* the states w ill be able to deal 
with one another more intelligently* This understanding w ill also 
decrease the fear o f the unknown by shedding light on the underpinnings of 
another's policy-making.
An analysis of the decision-making process requires an 
understanding of the requisite tools needed to establish the guidelines of 
analysis. Arnold C. Horelick has shown these basic tools to be paradigms* 
theories and models. 1 A model* in his definition* Is a cohesive set o f 
ideas that form a coherent system. A theory is  a more abstract structure
6o f  assumptions and Inferences o f a generalised nature. Most basic of a ll  
is  the paradigm, the fundamental block of assumptions upon which a theory 
Is  based. Theories are built on paradigms and may generate numerous 
models. According to Horelick, the lack o f theories in the socia l 
sciences which enjoy the precision and quality o f those in other core 
sciences forces most discussion of decision-making to take place on the 
level of the paradigm. He has furthermore defined two paradigms as 
central to the analysis of the decision-making process, the analytic and 
cybernetic paradigms.
Of the two paradigms, the analytic is the older one and therefore 
more thoroughly developed. Horelick has substituted the word analytic for 
rational, because the connotations of rational choices as those which 
produce the "best" results may not always mesh with the approximations of 
the decision-making models. Models incorporating this paradigm "involve a 
decision-maker acting to maximise his values given the constraints which 
he faces." This assumes a series o f calculations carried out in a very 
deliberate fashion. The decision-maker must fir s t  decide what different 
values or u t ility  he places on the various possible states o f  the world. 
At the same timt he must determine which options w ill lead to the end he 
most clearly prefers. This process must be repeated as new situations 
raquiring decisions arise, and can ba updated to deal with information 
faadback from previous decisions. In this methodical fashion the 
deci8ion-maker presumably employs a form of cost-benafit analysis to 
achlavt his objectives.
Analytic theory has had a good deal of success in explaining a 
number of different processes in different areas, euch at microeconomics 
end mathematic®. Particularly when applied to individual decision-making,
7the analytical method provides a coherent theoretical structure. Yet a 
number o f questions have arisen concerning the usefulness o f this paradigm 
for studying the development o f national po licy . The central flaw is that 
one cannot successfully aggregate a group of individual decision-makers 
and consider the aggregation to be an accurate re flection  o f co lle ct iv e  
a ctiv ity . A second problem is  that to deal e ffe c t iv e ly  with the mass o f 
information and data required for decision-making on a national scale and 
to make a l l  the calculations which such a formal methodology requires 
would be too d i f f ic u lt .  This leads one to believe there must be less 
complicated methods for dealing with at least a certain portion o f the 
decision-making.
The search for alternatives to the analytic paradigm and a 
resolution o f the problems inherent in i t  gave rise to a newer and less 
developed idea, that o f the cybernetic paradigm. Essentially, the 
cybernetic paradigm lim its the range and purposive activ ity  of the 
decision-maker. Rather than pursue a d istin ct outcome which has been 
calculated to be the best, the decision-maker sets in motion a set of 
standard operating procedures which w ill produce an outcome. A decision 
is  fragmented into smaller decisions which can be dealt with individually 
by the appropriate group, with input limited to what is  pertinent to that 
particular problem only. Rather than add together the rational 
calculations of several individual actors, the cybernetic paradigm assumes 
a fina l decision to be the co llectiv e  product of a series o f  operational 
procedures.
This paradigm concerns I ts e lf  with the parts o f the process, while 
the analytic paradigm looks at the whole. As there is  no need to 
eatsblieh a hierarchy o f preferences, no need to calculate outcomes and
8results o f basic decisions, the cybernetic paradigm starts out on a
fundamentally d ifferent footing than the analytic paradigm. The two
paradigms compete with one another and yet are often linked into one,
generally with features of the cybernetic system being imposed on the
analytic system as constraints. The competition between the two seems
ben eficia l, however, in that i t  generates alternate viewpoints on
Important decision processes. It is  therefore very Important that the
d istinctions between the two be maintained and even sharpened.
As noted ea rlie r , the paradigm functions as the base upon which
complete models for Analysis may be developed. The cybernetic and
analytic paradigms serve in an abstract fashion as the bases upon which
more practical models can be formulated. These models serve as the
framework for the day-to-day analysis o f  policy  decision-making. There
are three models at the most general leve l, which have been outlined by
3
Graham Allison as the most basic models. These include the Governmental 
(dureau cratlc)-P olltlcs , Organisational-Process and Rational-Actor models. 
The bureaucratic-politic8 model has also recently developed what is
essen tia lly  an offshoot of the standard bureaucratic model, thanks to the
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work o f Karen Dawisha. These two w ill be discussed in greater detail in 
subsequent pages. The rational-actor and organisational-process models, 
however, w ill receive a less intensive scrutiny, as they seem to have less 
to o ffe r  in Soviet foreign policy  analysis than either the bureaucratic 
model or its  offspring.
The rational-actor model is  the oldest and most widely accepted of 
the models presented. It  is  essentially an 11. • • attempt to explain 
international events by recounting the aims and calculations of nations or
a
governments.0 It  implies purposive, planned actions aimed at achieving a
■i
9preconceived goal. The nation is  given the attributes of a unitary actor 
seeking to maximize his potential for security and development according 
to a plan. There are four basic Ideas which compose the rational-actor 
model and give It the cohesiveness necessary for Its durability . F irst, 
each possible action w ill have a consequence, and this consequence must be 
ranked preferentially  on a "u t i l it y "  scale set up by the agent. This Is 
the establishment o f  goals and ob jectives. Next the agent must lay out 
a l l  the alternatives he is  faced with. Following this branching-out 
procedure, the consequence o f  each alternative and variation on these 
alternatives must also be taken Into account. The last a ctiv ity  for the 
agent is  simply to pick the action which has the highest consequence 
rating In his u t i l ity  scale. By following this step-by-step procedure the 
decision-maker w ill arrive at the most rational, i . e . ,  "best" possible 
action to pursue.
The attraction  of th is model is  the way It establishes a degree o f  
consistency on something which is  often beyond the capacity o f the analyst 
or layman to control, the decisions o f a sovereign. It Is comforting to 
think that there are reasons for the things done and that they belong to 
some rational plan. Ip using this model the analyst puts himself In the 
shoes of the actor and determines what would seem to be or have been the 
most log ica l choices to make given the circumstances. In this way 
decisions can be determined to have made sense, and therefore be easier to 
deal with. For a l l  the neatness o f this solution , it  remains flawed in 
some ways. Ths major problem is  that i t  assumes an unrealistic degrss o f 
cohesive, purposive behavior on the part o f the decision-maker. Things 
are rarely as deliberate and clean as th is model would have one believe. 
A 8oviet Analyst observing the American p o lit ic a l  scene would find the
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"d ra stic11 policy changes of every new election  term to be anything but 
rational and orderly. The rational-actor model does not take into accour 
many o f the various influences acting on the decision-making process, in 
large part because the Inclusion oi these things In the calculations 
involved in this model would make i t  prohibitively burdensome.
When considering the actions of a single human being, one may best 
consider them as choices made In an e ffo rt to maximise a goal. Yet this 
model does not transfer so easily  to the actions of nations. When 
discussing a situation , we are quick to say "X 's point of view is . • 
Nations are not, however, single en tities  with single points of view, a 
notion the rational-actor model does not take into account.
The organizational process occupies quite the other end o f the 
spectrum. This process derives d irectly  from the cybernetic paradigm; 
indeed i t  is  the only truly cybernetic model of the four under review. An 
analyst observing decision-making using the organisational-process model 
would see rational decisions as the aggregate of numerous outputs from the 
numerous organizations which compose any government. The various units 
w ill act on the parts of a situation relevant to them according to a 
standard procedure. This is  one o f the core concepts of the model. Large 
groups of individuals require standard operating procedures i f  they are to 
be coordinated in any meaningful fashion. It is  the acting out o f  these 
procedures which determines the actions we see as fin a l decisions. These 
procedures are not necessarily d irectly  controlled by the leader o f an 
organisation, but rather are disrupted by the interference o f  a leader. 
The longer a procedure is  adopted as the standard method, the more 
resistant i t  is  to change, though change may occur gradually in response 
to  changes to the decision-making environment. In sum, organisational
11
process refers to the procedure whereby the many different organizations 
which compose a government execute a standard procedure resulting in a 
decision , not necessarily under the influence o f any one leader or with 
any parochial designs in mind.
While the organizational process o ffe rs  an entirely  d ifferent 
perspective for the analysis of decision-making, there are as yet too many 
lim itations on the model for i t  to be essentia l. It is a rela tively  new 
area of study, with more research done on it  for the analysis of economic 
and corporate behavior than for p o lit ica l  analysis. Perhaps the major 
d if f icu lty  in applying this process to a study o f the Soviet Union is  the 
lack of pertinent information. This model requires a great deal of 
information about the structure and methods o f the various organizations, 
including budget estimates and personnel structures, which is  largely 
unavailable in the Soviet context. We are therefore reduced to 
assumptions, with their inherent d e fic ien cies . A further lim itation is  
that th is model is  less useful than others for the study o f c r is is  
behavior. Standard operating procedures are subject to inordinate 
stresses during a c r is is  and may not prove re liab le  for the analysis of 
dec18ion-making.
It would seem worthwhile at this point to reiterate that these 
models are not to be considered useless and f i t  merely to be cast aside. 
They do indeed o ffe r  insights into the actions of a nation and its  
decision-making process. It is  simply that i t  would be beyond the scope 
o f  this work to try to accommodate a l l  available models. The 
bu reaucratic-politics model and the model developed by Karen Davlsha seem 
to have the most to o ffe r  in the analysis of Soviet a ctiv ity  with which we
12
are concerned. Before beginning this analysis, however, some discussion 
o f these two models is  in order.
The bureaucratic-politics model as defined by A llison  and 
developed by J ir i  Valenta fa lls  somewhere between the extremes of the 
rational-actor and organizational-processes models. It does not concern 
i t s e l f  with one individual leader s ittin g  atop a nation, nor with the 
multitude o f organizations which constitute a government. Instead, the 
focus is  on the group of leaders, the heads o f the various organizations 
and groups, who together form the source of a nation's co lle c t iv e  
leadership. One is  quick to say that this is not always the case, that 
leaders such as Stalin and Franco operated with a minimum of c o lle c t iv ity . 
This is  easily conceded, except to add that governments of this type are 
not the norm, and that even these men presided over bureaucracies that 
were subject to po litick in g . The average government, then, formulates 
decisions that are the product o f a process o f "pulling and hauling" by 
the various groups that are its  power sources.
This model is  perhaps particularly well suited for analysis o f 
Soviet p o lit ic s . The senior decision-makers who comprise the Politburo 
and to a lesser extent the Central Committee, represent the leadership of 
numerous organizations responsible for running the Soviet state. The 
Interests o f  these bosses are partly parochial, varying in Intensity 
depending on the leader and the organization. When a decision is  needed, 
the leader projects the view that w ill benefit h is  organization most. 
This is  not to say that individual Interests are more important to the 
leader than are national security Interests. It can be assumed that a l l  
participants in the inner c ir c le , the Politburo, are patriots who believe 
in their country and in it*  power. The way in which the individual
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perceives things, however, and the way he interprets and reports 
information, may be colored by his organizational Interests.
The layman might find the idea o f  having such major decisions 
decided by politick in g  to be highly d istaste fu l, but such does seem to be 
the case. The struggles for influence which this model suggests are as 
much attempts to have one’ s views adopted in a competitive atmosphere as 
attempts to Increase personal and organizational power. Since there are 
many contending organizations, most decisions come about as compromises 
that have been reached through extensive bargaining. In th is sense, the 
bureaucratic-politics model is  truly an example of a co lle ct iv e  system at 
work* A llison  c ites  as an example the attitude o f  the KGB to detente. 
Even this organization, one among many, experienced co n flic t  between 
d ifferent factions with d ifferent points o f view. The domestic branch was 
not Interested in negotiations that would only make it s  job of Internal 
control more d i f f i c u lt .  At the same time, the foreign branch knew that 
many new opportunities would arise out of the increased contacts with the 
West.* This is  but one example of the d ifferin g  perspectives that would 
lead organizational leaders to back d ifferent policy  choices. It is  out 
o f the ’’pulling and hauling” performed by these leaders that their 
c o lle ct iv e  decisions are reached.
The bureaucratic-politics model developed by A llison is  intended 
fo r  use in  the analysis o f any advanced Industrialized society. This 
assumes sim ilarities between these nations which Dr. Davisha has some 
d if f ic u lty  accepting. She suggests, in reference to A llison 's  use o f the 
United States as a model, that "to extrapolate Soviet behaviour by 
reference to the American experience is  to overlook factors unique to the 
USSR which have an important bearing on the universality of the
14
Bureaucratic P o litics  M o d e l . A n  alternate point o f view concernin| the 
extent of the universality of the bureaucratic-politics model has been put 
forward by Dr. Dawisha. She feels  that in the context o f the analysis of 
Soviet foreign policy  there are too many incongruities with the American 
system upon which A llison  bases his mod*l to allow the bureaucratic- 
p o lit ic s  model to transcend borders so easily . There are numerous factors 
indigenous to the Soviet Union, such as, ’’ the pervasive role o f the Party 
in bureaucratic c o n flic t , the influence o f ideology in providing universal 
goals, the representation o f a wide range o f functional and expert 
opinion, and the d iversity  o f  channels of a< t ss to the decision-making 
process (which) a l l  serve to undermine the app licab ility  o f the model." 
To the extent that the bureaucratic system does operate in the Soviet 
Union, the model is  a useful too l, but only in conjunction with methods 
which take a ll  these other factors into account.
Despite these d ifferences, Dawisha does use the bureaucratic- 
p o lit ic s  model as a basis for her methods. She allows for a greater 
number o f Influencing factors than others, Including Allison and Vaienta. 
However, these factors are used as a supplement rather than a refutation 
o f  the bureaucratic-politics model. The most d istin ctive  feature of the 
way Dr. Dawisha looks at Soviet policy  is her concern with those aspects 
o f  policy  decisions that deal with c r is is  and crisis-induced stress. This 
focus necessarily lim its the app licab ility  of her methods, yet they are 
aptly suited for the purposes o f this work. Using the bureaucratic model 
as a lens, I hope that through an analysis o f the events o f the Prague 
Spring o f 1968 I may shed some light on Soviet policy  formulation.
CHAPTEK 111
The Soviet attitude towards the Czech government o f Alexander 
Dubcek during the c r is is  period oi 1968 was never a fu lly  cohesive or 
unanimous one. At various points throughout the c r is is  various groups and 
organizations within the Soviet government presented and supported various 
viewpoints. Yet to the outside world the Soviet Union appeared to be a 
purposeful agent relentlessly carrying out its  w ill. The rea lity  of the 
trading back and forth» the "pulling and hauling" which actually went on 
in the Politburo, was well hidden oehind a facade o f unity and 
decisiveness. It was only la ter, well after the fact, that the release of 
b its  and pieces o f information allowed a clearer picture to be formed. 
Our perceptions o f the perspectives o f the Soviet leaders s t i l l  remain 
based on Inference. It is mainly through the reports and d iaries of Czech 
figures centra, to the events, along with the published speeches of Soviet 
leaders, that scholars such as J ir i  Valenta have pieced together a picture 
oi Soviet attitudes towards Czechoslovakia in 1968.‘
The world the Soviet leadership faced in the period around the 
Prague Spring, the peaceful revolution in Czechoslovakia, was one of few 
certa inties and many potential problems. Czechoslovakia was certainly not 
the focus o f Soviet concern, until the middle months of 1968. Relations 
with the United States seemed in good order, with President Johnson
15
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expressing a strong interest in beginning SALT talks as soon as possible.
The r i f t  with China had widened, however, and concerns about this populous
southern neighbor occupied Soviet minds more than a l l  other foreign policy
matters. At home, B^eznnev was active in consolidating his own position
as the dominant figure in Soviet p o l i t ic s  and was consequently forced to
step ligh tly . The attention paid to these events, "allowed the
Czechoslovak reform program of democratization and serious infighting
between members o f the Czechoslovak ruling e lite  to go almost unnoticed by
2
the Soviet leadership . . ." until the situation became c r it ica l.
Unlike the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia had had experience with a 
form of representative government. According to Zdenek Mlynar, 
"Totalitarian dictatorship was an alien system Imported from the USSR, 
whereas the domestic p o lit ica l traditions of the past f i fty  years lay 
mainly in the struggle to create a pluralist democracy." Though the 
fervor and revolutionary zeal which characterized the Hungarian Revolution 
o f 1956 was not so evident, there was su fficien t support for the gradual 
transformation which was taking place. The gradual change expected by 
o f f ic ia ls  o f the Czech party, such as Mlynar, was drastically  accelerated 
by the ouster of President Novotny in January of 1968. The removal o f a 
number o f his supporters soon followed, as did the ascension o f his major 
opponent, Alexander Dubcek. Novotny was not given the support he desired 
by the Soviets, who appeared satisfied  with the credentials o f Mr. Dubcek. 
Rather than submit to  the prevailing opinion that he should go, Novotny 
and his supporters continued to figh t. It was, however, the publication 
in April o f 1968 o f a summary statement on the reforms of socialism to be 
attempted by the Ccecha, later famous as the Action Program, which anded 
the f i r s t  major phase o f the Prague Spring.
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The cris l6  resumed during July 1968. A group o f reformists 
drafted what became known as the Two Thousand Words Manifesto, a letter of 
concern for the security of the reform movement, signed by many athletes, 
entertainers and others. An upsurge in the activ ity  o f anti-reform ists 
such as Kolder, Indra and V. Bilak moved the reformists to publish this 
manifesto in hopes o f mobilizing popular opinion for their cause. At this 
point there was also a ca ll for an Extraordinary Party Congress to e lect a 
new government. The realization by the anti-reform ists that they would 
likely  lose their positions at this Congress, called for September 9, 
further spurred them to force a change or halt in the reform movement. 
The increasing militancy of the Czechs, the acceleration o f economic and 
socia l reforms, and growing pressure from frightened anti-reform ists all. 
served to Increase concern in the one country which could decisively 
se ttle  the dispute, the Soviet Union.
During July, according to Valenta, the Soviet Politburo had also 
begun to sp lit  into two camps, the interventionists and 
noninterventionists. A number of individuals could at this point be 
clearly  placed within one or the other group. Perhaps the most vocal of 
a ll  Soviet interventionists was P. Ye. Shelest, First Secretary o f the 
Ukrainian Central Committee. He feared the spread of the Czechoslovak 
reforms into the nearby Ukraine, which would greatly complicate hie own 
position . Most heads of the westernmost republics such as Latvia and 
Estonia, as well as heads of the Central Committees of large c it ie s  with 
large concentrations of the in te lligen tsia , favored an end to the 
cancerous situation in the West. To a certain extent i t  can also be said 
that the m ilitary and the KGB were in favor o f  Intervention, due to 
concerns for Warsaw Pact troop morale and the exposure o f  previous KGB
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a ctiv ity  (the Slansky tr ia l)  in Czechoslovakia due to the removal o f 
censorship. Another major pro-interventionist group was composed o f 
Walter Ulbricht of East Germany and Wladyslaw Gomulka o f Poland. They 
were seriously concerned for their positions, as the potential for similar 
occurrences in their own countries was great.
The formation of a coa lition  in favor o f intervention stimulated 
the formation of a coa lition  opposed to intervention. This proup in the 
Soviet Union was often more shadowy, with opinions changing hb the 
situation developed. M.A. Suslov, Secretary of the Central Committee, was 
one of the non-interventionists. Whereas the interventionists tended to 
view the Czechoslovakian situation as zero-sum game with the winner 
gaining and the loser losing, the non-interventionists saw room for 
maneuver, for a peaceful solution of the co n flic t  in which both sides 
would win. They fe lt  the price of m ilitary action would be too high. 
Most o f the policy-maker8 in this coalition  were men like  A.N, Kosygin, 
whose major respon sib ilities were in international a ffa ir s . They fe lt  
that the blow that Intervention would give to Soviet prestige, 
particularly with the advent o f  detente, would be too great a price to pay 
for  a situation they did not consider c r i t ic a l .  Members o f  the Western 
Communist parties and, notably, Janos Kadar of Hungary, also preferred a 
peaceful resolution o f the c o n flic t .
Neither of these groups were entirely  clear-cut. Leaders d rifted , 
vacilla ted  or frequently remained neutral until forced to make a decision. 
Such was particularly the case with Brezhnev, who never clearly  joined 
either aide, preferring to mediate between the two. It was only at the 
very last moment that he came down in favor o f intervention, at a time 
when it  was practically inevitable. He was s t i l l  Involved in
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consolidating bis position , and was concerned not to alienate any one
large group. Yet the battle for p o lit ica l  control in Czechoslovakia 
c lose ly  mirrored the jockeying in the Soviet Union and was, essentia lly , 
"from the onset, not a product of ideological orthodoxy, but a direct and 
Important aspect of the internal struggle in the Moscow power structure." 
In both countries, there was as much concern with how a decision would 
a ffe ct each individual involved, as there was with the national and 
ideolog ica l e ffects  o f the decision.
One of the alternatives to invasion which was developed early on 
was a barrage of pressure on the Dubcek government to slow its  reform 
process. This was fine with the interventionists, who merely saw i t  as a 
means o f creating more support for their position by pointing out the
faults o f  the reformist government. The anti-intervention ists, on the 
other hand, saw this as an opportunity to avoid an invasion by convincing 
Dubcek to take control o f the situation himself. A major tool in this 
psychological game was the presence o f Soviet troops on Czech s o il .  
Warsaw Pact troops in Czechoslovakia for exercises stayed well beyond 
their announced pull-back date, increasing the uncertainty over Soviet 
intentions. Also, on July 14 a summit was held in Warsaw, with the Czechs 
voluntarily not attending. The result o f  this summit was a jo in t letter 
sent to the Czechoslovak leadership warning that what was going on in 
Czechoslovakia was not to be considered purely a Czech concern, and was 
therefore subject to the "approval" o f other so c ia lis t  nations. The 
non-interventionists hoped that this would provide a su fficien t warning to 
the Czechs.
The stalemate that seemed to be developing between the two
cca lltion s  in the Politburo caused the debate to widen as both sides
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sought to expand their base. The Central Committee served this function 
during 1968, being seen as "an important device for generating consensus 
and support of controversial p o lic ie s  among key bureaucratic e lite s ."^  
The meeting called for in July of 1968 was dominated by Interventionists, 
yet most intriguing o f a ll was that the major speakers were men associated 
with domestic p o licy , demonstrating the Importance of domestic interests 
in  foreign a ffa irs .^  Speaker a fter speaker condemned the Czech party for 
its  lack o f  resolve, and many expressed concern with the e ffe c t  o f the 
Prague Spring on Soviet c it izen s . The session ended with a resolution 
supporting the Warsaw Letter, a demonstration of the "unity" o f the Soviet 
government.
Soviet plans for using psychological and p o lit ica l pressure to 
force the hand o f the Dubcek government worked, though not as desired by 
the Soviets, Instead of a crackdown on reform, Soviet actions caused 
"Dubcek and some o f h is supporters, a fter  several months of 
Indecisiveness, to act like leaders o f an independent state and to defy 
the Soviet leadership."^ The non-intervention coa lition  in the Kremlin 
suffered a defeat, while the position  of the Interventionists was 
strengthened. In Czechoslovakia, however, the unity thus Inspired 
signalled the end o f  the antireform ist c o a lit io n 's  a b ility  to put up a 
figh t. Another group now brought their Influence into the fray. Western 
Communist parties sent representatives to Moscow to suggest that military 
action on the part o f the Soviet Union would lead them to convene a 
separate conference o f  European Communist parties, thereby effectin g  a 
sp lit  with Moscow. This threat served to Increase the anxieties o f the 
non-interventionists, as most o f  them, including Suslov and Kosygin, were 
d irectly  concerned with international a ffa ir s . The interventionists, men
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like Shelest who were generally unconcerned by what the Western Communists 
might do, were not impressed with the threat. The non-interventionists 
managed to gain the upper hand for the moment, however, long enough to 
propose a last attempt to negotiate an end to the c r is is .
The negotiations which took place at Cierna nad Tisou, a small 
town on the Czech-Soviet border, appeared to be a stop-gap measure 
Initiated by the non-interventionists in hopes that the Czechs would be 
su ffic ien tly  cooperative to convince the interventionists that risky 
measures were not necessary. Convened July 29, the meeting lasted for 
four long days o f very serious bargaining. A ll four o f the coa lit ion s , 
both sides in both countries, were represented in the bargaining 
committees. The Soviets sent a fu ll  delegation with a complete s ta ff . 
This re flected  the desire o f the members to see for themselves what was 
happanlng in Czechoslovakia. Each side feared that the other side would 
manipulate the proceedings and the subsequent reporting o f the proceedings 
so as to best suit their own needs. Perhaps the most forcefu l of 
characters was Shelest, who seemed to desire a break-off o f negotiations. 
In this he succeeded when "Dubcek and other members o f the CPC delegation 
had walked out o f  the meeting a fter  P. Shelest had made shameless 
statements about the Czechoslovaks * alleged attempts to wrest the 
Carpatho-Ukralne from the Soviet Union and about Kriegel not being a f i t  
negotiating partner because he was a 'Jew from H alle .1 The Soviet 
polltburo apologized, but the negotiations continued only in small 
groups." The Soviet non-interventionists, and at th is point also
Brezhnev, were distressed by th is breakdown and sought to renew the 
discussions. They found conuson ground with Dubcek in deciding to discuss 
S ocia list unity and the allegiance o f Czechoslovakia to the Warsaw Pact.
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This issue strengthened the hand o l the reformists and the 
non-interventionists, while neatly avoiding the thornier problem o f 
domestic changes and their e ffe cts  on other countries' domestic policy . 
This a l l  came about during a six-nation conference at Bratislava on August 
3.
The main function o f the Bratislava Conference was to draft a
jo in t  declaration affirming the results o f the Clem s meeting. The result
was a vague, ambiguous document which could be Interpreted to support the
views o f any o f the participants. The Czechs did, however, allow the
inclusion o f many sentences which suggested they would toe the Soviet line
more carefully in the future. Dubcek appears to have been attempting to
reassure his a l l ie s  that the Czechs were w illing  to cooperate with them.
Many, however, saw the Bratislava Declaration as a sort o f  se ll-ou t.
Writing imnedlately after the conference. Professor 1. Svltak echoed the
popular sentiment when he noted that "at Cierna the Communists may have
achieved self-determ ination for the party . . .  in the eyes o f  the people
they have gained considerably, because they allegedly succeeded In
defending the sovereignty of the state. However, the unity o f  the nation
which was created in the c r it ic a l  days has been radically shaken by the
President's address to the nation after the Bratislava Declaration, so
th is  unity has quickly disappeared in the wake o f the declaration 's
o
disagreeable Munich phraseology." The participants le f t  the conference 
feeling  as vague as the wording o f the declaration. The momentum of the 
interventionists had been halted, but only very temporarily. It was now 
time for the Soviet leadership to withdraw and evaluate the outcome of the 
two meetings.
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The meetings at Cierna and Bratislava* though not resulting in any 
concrete changes, had the e ffe ct  of appearing to defuse the situation* 
While there was talk , there was hope that the issues could be resolved 
peacefully. This hope was not shared by a l l ,  however. The fears o f the 
interventionists and the anxieties o f  the anti-reform ists were not 
m ollified  by the vague promises received from the Czechs. There had been 
no agreement to reimpose censorship, a major problem for many Soviet 
bureaucrats responsible for ideological control. Since the removal of 
censorship, most o f the underground literature carrying information on 
foreign a ffa irs  used the Czech press as i t s  source. Underground printings 
o f the speeches of Dubcek, Smyrkovsky and other reform leaders gave Soviet 
Intellectuals access to the ideas involved in the Czech experiment with 
democratic socialism *^ The Increase in underground a c t iv ity , plus the 
sensationalism of events like the tr ia l o f Ginzburg and Galanskov in the 
spring o f 1968, only served to increase the vigor with which the 
bureaucrats attacked the Czechs. Men like S.P. Trapeznlkov, head o f the 
Department o f Science and Education, feared the spread o f  the Czech 
reforms into a ll  o f Eastern Europe and the USSR. The promises made by the 
Czechs to stay loyal to the Warsaw Pact had very l i t t l e  impact on these 
men, whose concerns lay elsewhere. The armed forces, many in the KGB, and 
Gomulka and Ulbrlcht a l l  contributed what they could to the interven­
tion ist cause in hopes o f protecting their positions.
Though the recent conferences had served to moderate the 
situation , the rapid approach o f September 9 served to heat i t  up. On 
September 9 a session o f an extraordinary Party Congress was to be held, 
and i t  was widely known that nearly a l l  the antireform ists would lose 
their positions. The newly formed government would have the e ffe c t  o f
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establishing the reformist p o lic ies  o f Dubcek and his supporters as the 
legitimate policy  of the Czechoslovak nation. At that point i t  would be 
extremely d if f ic u lt  for Moscow to control the situation and this thorn in 
its  side would become a ll  the more firmly entrenched. The antireform ists 
and Interventionists combined to step up the pressure as much as possible, 
as the only hope for change now lay in convincing the Soviet Politburo 
that a counterrevolution by an unpopular government was underway in 
Czechoslovakia. To this end, according to Valenta, a ll  sorts o f 
misinformation and laundered information on the extent of the changes and 
on Dubcek'8 "narrow" base nf support were created to be fed to the 
Politburo.
On August 12, eight days before the intervention, a report was 
issued by the antireform ist-controlled Information bureau of the 
Czechoslovak Central Committee. This paper, known as the Kaspar Report, 
was in fluentia l in convincing the Soviet Politburo of the increasingly 
dangerous situation in Czechoslovakia. The following day, a block o f 
antireform ists in the Czech Presidium decided to stop aiding in the 
preparation for the Party Congress. This had the dual purpose of slowing 
their p o lit ica l demise and giving the appearance that the Czechoslovak 
Presidium was coming apart. The one area where no successful argument 
could be made remained foreign p o licy . In truth the concern o f the Soviet 
leadership was not that Czechoslovakia would leave the Pact or COMECON, 
rather that, " . . .  it  would continue to belong to these organizations 
and that unrestricted and uncontrolled reformism would in fect the other 
members and perhaps in the long run, the Soviet Union it s e l f ." * *  This was 
the core issue for  the interventionists. The Prague Spring represented an 
experiment with a potential for spreading rapidly. They recognized that
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the reformist, somewhat decentralizing nature of this experiment 
endangered their control o f  events in their own domains and therefore 
ultimately threatened their own positions. It was this fear, accelerated 
by the advancing of the date of the Slovak Congress of August 26* which 
forced them to push for immediate action.
The decision to intervene seems to have been made on the 17th of 
August. Plans for this contingency had certainly been drawn up Jong 
before, yet It was only at the last minute that the final decision was 
made. As with most major Soviet policy decisions, the evidence available 
is  sketchy at best, but what evidence there is available suggests that a 
renewal o f  the debate amongst the members of the Politburo was initiated 
from August 15 through the 17th. At this time, it became clear that the 
interventionists had managed to overcome the hesitations of the 
non-interventionists, and that Brezhnev had finally  aligned with the 
former. One last attempt was made to reach a negotiated settlement when 
on the 17th Janos Kadar of flunga! y met secretly with Pubcek. Dubcek chose 
to disregard Radar’ s wathihgB as lie «Hd a warning letter sent by the 
Soviet Politburo on August 19. It is probable that at this point i t  was 
too late for Dubcek to a ffect  the course of events anyway. Most o f the 
Soviet decision-makers appear .o ha/e accepted the view that events in 
Czechoslovakia were reaching a c r i t i c a l  stage, and were consequently 
swayed towards the interventionist side of the debate. On the 17th of 
August the decision was reached, and on the evening of August 20th, the 
tanks began to r o l l .
The forces which proved su ffic ien t to sway the minds o f the 
wavering Politburo members spelled the doom of Prague's experiment with 
humanizing socialism. Yat there had bean opportunities for a d ifferent
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outcome, had various leaders of the reformist and non-interventionist 
groups been better players o f the game of bureaucratic p o l i t i c s .  Dubc^k 
in particular was too concerned with the progress of reform in bis own 
country tv' spend the time necessary to get the Soviets to believe that the 
reforms rea 11 iipresented no threat to them He did not make the ef fort
to expand b\H tiv vith Brv >■» v , vho hv most vcounts favored Dubcek and 
oiten gave the heov m « ot the dv ubt. The various o f f i c i a l s  had
vngaged in xh\ " o d l in g  and hauling" by which Valenta says major policy 
dev istons ait reached. Certain players proved better suited than others, 
with their viewpoints coming to represent the "unanimous" view of the 
decision-making bodies. The reasons these individuals had for pushing 
their viewpoints represent a mixture of ideological and national interests 
with more personal motives. The end result, however, was a be lie f that 
the Prague Spring represented too great a danger to be allowed to 
flourish, and was therefore cut o f f  by the intervention of the Soviet 
military machine.
CHAPTER IV
An understanding of the process whereby a nation arrives at its 
foreign-policy decisions is essential to the development of a coherent 
policy by allied  or adversarial nations. When this basic knowledge is  
expanded to include an understanding of the risk-taking propensities of 
the decision-makers, along with how decision-making is affected by cr is is  
conditlons» one is  far better equipped for dealing with the subject nation 
in the International arena. In this nuclear age, a better understanding 
such as results from this knowledge becomes more of a necessity than a 
luxury.
People take risks every day, though often as not without making i t  
a conscious procedure. Risk involves a judgement o f probabilities, with 
the decision to take or to avoid the risk resulting from the comparison o f 
probabilities with an individual u t ility  function. When the risk proves 
"acceptable,"  the decision becomes action. The dictionary defines the 
verb "to risk" as "to expose to the chance o f Injury or loss ."*  This 
defin ition  is  insu fficient for our needs as i t  does not account for 
probability theory. Hannas Adomeit nicely sums up the concept o f  
international risk  as "a degree o f b e lie f about the likelihood o f a 
catastrophe in the relations o f  sta tes." The phrase "likelihood o f 
catastrophe" implies a probability measurement. Kennedy is  said to have 
claimed the odds for nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union during the
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Cuban M issile Crisis to have been between one out of three and even. This 
is an example of the most straightforward of probability measurements. 
The judgements we make are rarely as conscious as that, involving more of 
an abstract "feeling" about the p oss ib ilit ie s  for certain events to occur.
Probability 1b only one of the factors which must be considered 
when discussing risk-theory. The value of achieving a certain goal, the 
u t ility  function of the individual actor, must also be considered. These 
two ideas, probability and u t i lity , imply a very conscious, rational 
process. Indeed, that is what is assumed for this study, as the 
usefulness o f studying irrational risk-taking is limited. Calculated, 
rational risk-taking is "a conscious process. It is behaviour which 
weighs means for the achievement of ends." Decision-makers co llective ly  
decide, in accordance with their traditions, goals, geopolitica l and 
domestic p o lit ica l conditions and national power, what risks are worth 
taking to achieve sp ecific  ends. At the same time there may be frameworks 
within which the decision-maker must operate, such as alliances and 
treaties, which limit the choices and options from which the actor may 
choose. The confluence o f a ll  these factors, the measure o f ends versus 
means, the status of the nation and the restrictions upon i t ,  is the basis 
upon which decisions are reached.
When analysing any nation's foreign policy behavior, it  is  of 
v ita l importance that one consider the history and traditions which form 
the environment that shaped its  leaders and decision-makei*». Whan one is  
determining the propensity o f any one nation towards the taking of risks, 
the character o f the decision-makers is  central to the issue. 
Particularly when one is  working within e bureaucretic-politics model that 
implies group participation , this method o f h istorica l observation gains
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va lid ity . Can anything be deduced from a glance at Russian history which 
would aid in this e ffo rt?  Whereas a fu ll-s ca le  analysis o f Russian and 
Soviet history is far beyond the scope o f this work, some generalizations 
may be possible.
The ideas which make up the outlook of a society as a whole are 
the product o f decades' worth o f accumulated wisdom. Those who survive 
the rigors of l i f e  pass on their knowledge to the next generation in true 
Darwinian fashion. It is this storehouse of wisdom which forms the basis 
for the current outlook of any given leader. In Russia, where even as 
late as the 1900s nearly 80 percent o f  the population were peasants, 
fishermen, lumbermen, etc. the peasant tradition and relations with the 
land formed a large part o f the national psyche.
Living o f f  the land, one is subject to many forces outside one's 
con tro l, the primary one being the weather. When the climate was such 
that one received at best three grains for every one sown, the taking of a 
chance on a new method or new crop might easily  have resulted in a failed  
harvest, which often meant death. It was £ar easier to stick  with the 
norm and pray for good luck. The peasants were at the mercy o f more than 
the weather, though. Until the unification  o f the nation under the 
Hoscovltes, the r iva lr ies  among the various princes and princelings 
subjected countless peasants to the whims of leaders. Between 1228 and
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1462 there were no fewer than 90 Internal wars. After the long years of 
war, the establishment of a degree o f socia l order under the Muscovites 
must have been a great r e lie f  to the peasant footsold lers. The long 
trgdlU eh o f  centralised rule has not been altered sign ifican tly , nor does 
there appear to be much interest In altering i t .
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This points up a major issue. The structured environment within 
which the Soviets live is maintained by the compliance o f the populace. 
There are few indications that the ordinary citizen  would have i t  any 
other way. The great American traditions o f entrepreneurship with the 
risk-taking which this Implies are American experiences and less common in 
Russia or the Soviet Union. Indeed, many o f the Soviet emigres suffer
from a pervasive sense o f Insecurity because o f the relative lack o f 
d irect governmental guidance o f  their lives . While there are certainly a 
number o f  changes in the system which any Soviet citizen  may be quite 
happy to see come about, the system meets* in its  own crude way, the basic 
need8 of the average c it izen .
The mercurial agricultural climate, the dangers o f  a fragmented 
power structure, and the example of the suffering o f a nation weaker than 
it s  opponents (Nazi Germany) are concepts that may serve to make the 
Soviet c itizen  prone to risk-aversion. A steady, fa ir ly  conservative 
approach is  bound not so much to reap better results, as to prevent 
d isaster. The co llectiv e  nature of the society , which ostensibly spreads 
out the risk  among a ll  i t s  members, may also serve to reinforce the 
avoidance o f  unnecessary risk s . Perhaps history has taught the Russians 
and hence, the Soviets, that i t  is  v ita l to prevent loss , and secondary to 
achieve gain.
All th is is  meant to support the proposition that the people 
formulating policy  in the Soviet Union are not disposed toward taking 
unnecessary risks. Indeed, the Soviets are not about to take chances and 
r isk  defeat, as history has taught them that defeat carries an extremely 
severe penalty. It Is o f l i t t l e  surprise that the events of World War II  
ere s t i l l  the focus o f  so much attention in dally  8ovlet l i f e .  This does
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not preclude the taking of risks, only the unprepared, unplanned chance 
which cannot be clearly  conttnlled. This is the major feature of Soviet 
ventures: they are carefu lly  thought out and prepared fo r , with a l l  
exigencies covered. S t i l l  mindful o f the Russian proverb ' " I f  you don't 
know the ford don't step into the r iv e r , ' they do not plunge into contests 
blindly; they rarely gamble, unless they fee l the odds are overwhelmingly 
in their f a v o r W h e n  American forces were f ir s t  heavily committed in 
Vietnam, the extent o f  American knowledge o f the region was amazingly 
limited. There were few sources o f Information at the disposal o f the 
Administration which detailed the cultural and socio-economic background 
of the region. This would be, to the Soviets, an unimaginable mistake 
which may well prove su ffic ien t to Btop them from making an approach.^
Having garnered a l l  the knowledge necessary to Insure their 
a b ility  to handle the situation and prepare for a l l  eventualities, the 
Soviets w ill then proceed into a risky situation . When the probabilities 
of success are high and the risks manageable and comparatively low, yes, 
risks w ill be taken. This is  not to suggest, however, that caution w ill 
be thrown to the wind. The Soviets w ill engage in a sort o f sequential 
analysis in which each phase in the development o f  an event is studied 
anew, with an eye towards a change in  the balance between success and 
fa ilu re . The response o f the opponent must be weighed for it s  degree o f 
firmness and for what it  reveals about the determination o f the enemy. 
Things are done one st<tp at a time. The next step depends largely on the 
reaction o f the subject. Certain old axioms about "pushing to the lim it" 
and "engage in pursuit" of an enemy who fa lters or shows signs of weakness 
s t i l l  hold true, yet the admonition to  "retreat before superior f ir e "  
holds equally true. When i t  i s  possible to avoid the use o f  fores or at
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least the use o f Soviet fo rce , this is  very desirable. In many ways this 
policy  resembles the actions o f a defensive driver in a rush to get 
somewhere. If there is  an opening, he w ill attempt It but i f  challenged
too strongly, a retreat is  in order. This retreat is  another essential
feature. A fallback position must be prepared in advance so as to avoid 
complete disgrace.^ Opportunistic caution seems to be the major Soviet 
operational principle in the formulation o f foreign policy .
Once a decision has been reached and a risk  taken, there is always 
the chance that a c r is is  may develop. Such a situation may also come 
about as the result o f forces beyond the control o f  a nation 's
decision-makers, but regardless o f how a c r is is  has been arrived at, once 
developed i t  has a dramatic e ffe c t  on the decision-making process. Risk 
theory remains a v ita l part o f c r is is  theory, yet each also ex ists  as a 
separate entity . Whereas risk is  part o f the decision-making process, 
c r is is  is  an external factor Influencing the process i t s e l f .  C risis
theory therefore deserves as much attention as risk-taking theory, with 
special attention given to the interaction o f the two.
Michael Brecher's defin ition  o f c r is is  appears to be well suited
for consideration o f foreign policy  analysis, and is  as follow s:
A c r is is  is  a situation with three necessary and su ffic ien t conditions, 
deriving from a change o f its  external or Internal environment. A ll 
three conditions are perceptions held by the highest leve l decision­
makers:
1. a threat to basic values, with a subsequent
2. high probability o f Involvement in m ilitary h o s t ilit ie s  and the
awareness o f g
3. fin ite  time for response to the external value threat.
This defin ition  assumes crises in adversarial rela tions, as 
d is tin ct from those crises which arise between a l l ie s .  Having defined the 
concept o f  c r is is ,  Brecher goes on to develop a four-stage model o f  
international c r is is  behavior. The f ir s t  stage Involves the in it ia l
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trigger act which changes the environment and introduces stress into the
situation . The change in environment need not represent a break in the
flow o f international behavior; it  may be merely an in tensification  of
existing but submerged h o s t i l it ie s . The stress introduced by this change
constitutes Brecher's second phase. At this point the three conditions
specified  in the defin ition  as value threats, war probability , and f in ite
time come into play. Being faced with these conditions, decision-makers
w ill use d ifferent mechanisms to cope with the c r is is ,  the third phase.
The process of receiving information, consulting with others, and
delineating the alternatives w ill lead d irectly  to the fin a l phase, which
is  the implementation o f the chosen line o f action. This w ill result in
feedback, which represents another environmental change, thereby
o
completing the loop. Our major concern here is  with the e ffe ct o f  the 
second phase, stress, on the normal operations o f the third phase, coping 
or decision-making.
Risk is  present at every step o f a c r is is  in greater or smaller 
amounts relative to the intensity of the c r is is  and the perceived threat 
to core values. It is  therefore d i f f ic u lt  to generalise on the c r is is  
behavior o f  a nation abstracted from any one particular incident, without 
making c r is is  behavior appear to be another term for risk  theory. The 
model for c r is is  behavior is  a universal one, and is  not Intended to show 
d ifferent methods within d ifferent systems. Specific parts o f the model 
can be pulled out and analysed according to the methods various nations 
adopt under similar circumstances, such as how their various decision­
making bodies are a ffected  by stress. Yet the behavior o f  an entire 
nation in a c r is is  cannot be specified  in any meaningful way as being very 
d istin ct from the behavior o f  any other nation. Whan discussing Soviet
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c r is is  behavior, what one is  then Investigating are the e ffe cts  o f 
crisis-induced stress on the decision-making bodies of the Soviet Union 
and the subsequent Interaction o f the decision and feedback loop.
Karen Dawisha uses a format developed by Brecher for analysis o f 
individual situations in her analysis o f the Soviet decision to invade 
Czechoslovakia. This format breaks down the c r is is  into p re -c r is is , 
c r is is  and p o s t-c r is is  periods with emphasis on the decision-process 
changes which occur during each phase. The p re -cris is  phase is  
characterized by an event that in itia tes  a dramatic Increase in the 
perception o f threat to the decision-makers, leading into the c r is is  
period, in which a l l  three characteristics o f a c r is is  situation become 
distinguishable. A dramatic decrease in the Intensity of the situation , 
in particular a decline in perceived fears or time constraints, signals 
the onset o f  the p o st-cr is is  period.*0 This format is  Intended to aid in 
discerning " . . .  the impact o f changing stress (manifested in changes in 
perceptions of threat, time salience and the probability o f war) on the 
decision  makers' coping mechanisms and choices."** The manner in which 
information is  processed and consultation occurs, which decisional forums 
are used and how alternatives are reached, is  the key to understanding the 
e ffe c ts  o f stress on decision making.
Though the situation in Czechoslovakia had been on the minds o f 
Soviet leaders for  some time, it  was the decision to ca ll  a Bloc 
conference in Dresden which Dawlsha considers to signal the beginning o f 
the p re -cr is is  period. At the point when this decision was made on the 
22nd o f March 1968, it  had become clear to the members o f  the Politburo 
that some form o f action needed to be taken in order to contain the events 
developing in Prague. The composition o f the Soviet delegation to the
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meeting was notable only in its  inclusion of P. fe. Shelest, First 
Secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee. Shelest had no foreign 
policy experience and was known as somewhat of a hard-liner. The results 
of the meeting were anything but hard-line from the Soviet perspective, 
however. Decisions were made to hold meetings on a Czech request for more 
loans and on integration of the Warsaw Pact high command, but most 
importantly the delegation came away from Dresden feeling that no further 
interference in Czech affairs would be required should the Prague
leadership hold to its  promises to assert control. These moderate 
positions were reached despite the already forceful e fforts  of the Poles 
and East Germans to reach a tougher position. The level of stress was 
low, as most Soviet leaders s t i l l  fe lt  the issue to be resolvable without 
direct Soviet intervention. This could not last, as pressure mounted for 
the Soviets to take charge of a situation which many leaders aaw as
rapidly getting out o f  control and endangering their positions.
The Czechoslovak party plenum, convened in April, forced the
moderate Soviets to reconsider. Brood changes in the composition of the
Czech leadership resulted in the impression that a l l  the Important 
positions would soon be in reformist hands. Only a few conservative 
members such as Bilak and Indra managed to retain their positions. The 
plenum also saw the adoption o f the Action Program, which included what 
the Soviets perceived as dangerous reforms of caneorahlp and e lectora l 
laws. The Soviet resetIon was mixed. A speech by Grishin representing 
the hard-liners brought to the fore the phrase "brotherly mutual aid" end 
sounded ominous warnings about so c ia lis t  unity. This was not the view of 
a ll  members of the Politburo, as the fact that, " . . .  such a major 
policy  statement wee made by a re la tive ly  junior Politburo member . . .
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outside proper party organs . . . and published in Izvestia rather than
Pravda suggests that the escalation of the c r is is  was not universally
12approved within party ranks." The attacks on the Soviets in the 
uncensored Czech media combined with the reluctance o f  the Czech 
government to cooperate wi h Warsaw Pact exercises gave the hard-liners in 
the Soviet Politburo the edge, and a meeting in Moscow with the Prague 
leaders was immediately convened. This signalled the end or the 
p re -cr is is  and beginning of the c r is is  period.
The e ffects  oi the stress generated by the awareness o f a 
situation that was potentially had for the Soviet decision-makers was 
fa ir ly  limited. The period seems mainly to have set the foundation for 
the more drastic accumulation of stress which was soon to come. Czech 
reforms involving the dismissal of large numbers o f  Soviet operatives from 
the ranks o f  the bureaucracy forced the Soviets to turn elsewhere for the 
information they began increasingly to desire. The sources they turned to 
were mostly hard-liners, and there is evidence that the information they 
were fed was considerably slanted to support the views of the 
interventionists. The decisional forums at this stage were s t i l l  fa ir ly  
large, involving both the fu ll  Central Committee and the Politburo. A 
sub-group within the Politburo was forming, composed of Brezhnev, Suslov, 
Podgorny, Shelest and, at least nominally, Kosygin. Thin sub-group would 
become increasingly more active as the c r is is  escalated. Overall, 
however, the real test was s t i l l  to come, and only the f irs t  signs of 
c r is is  could yet be discerned.
The general failure of the May 4 meeting to allay the fears of the 
Politburo can be seen as the point o f  escalation to a period of fu ll  
c r is is .  The Politburo f e l t  i t  necessary to step up the pressure on the
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Prague government and began to engage in a form of psychological warfare 
to intimidate the Czech leadership. In addition to increased polemical 
attacks in the press, the Soviet military crossed Into Czechoslovakia, 
ostensibly for Warsaw Pact n, neuvers but timed so as to coincide with the 
convening of the Czech Central Committee plenum at the end of May. These 
actions were the limited reactions of a divided Politburo, and the 
vacillation  between antagonism and conciliation  was the outward sign of 
the inner debate. The c r is is  was not so intense as to force individuals 
to choose absolute positions, and many took advantage of this to remain 
uncommitted and await further developments. There were flurries of 
o f f i c ia l  v is i t s ,  often by high-ranking Soviet o f f i c ia l s  trying to 
determine for themselves the nature o f  the Czech reform movement. These 
v is it s  set the stage for the strategic meetings at the end of May which 
temporarily put the non-interventionists in the ascendancy. The Czech 
Communist Party plenum proceeded smoothly, real firming the pre-eminent 
position of the Party and the role of socialism in guiding any reforms. 
This reassertlon o f  adherence to the principles of socialism, perhaps 
along with a Soviet desire to avoid antagonizing the United States with 
whom the Soviets were negotiating a treaty limiting nuclear weapons, 
encouraged a more reserved attitude in the Politburo.
June turned out to be relatively  calm, with both sides of the 
debate in the Politburo adopting a wait-and-see attitude. The epochs' 
tones were also moderated, with Dubcek lending his name to a letter by the 
Peoples M ilitia  disavowing any responsibility for the Inflammatory remarks 
o f  most o f the Czech press. This was greatly welcomed in Moscow, which 
was i t s e l f  in the midst of a serious debate over ?:he rehabilitation o f  
Stalin and tha naed for "greater intellectual v ig ilance ." The newfound
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freedom ot the Czech press could only be viewed negatively in Moscow, and 
Indeed throughout a ll the events o f 1968 represented one o f the great 
fears of the Soviet leaders. Total control of the populace was essential, 
and the Czech experiments represented a serious threat to control. This 
fear was proven valid most dramatically with the publication in Prague of 
the "2000 Words” on June 27.
The ” 2000 Words” document proved too much for the Soviets.
Despite immediate condemnation by Dubcek, Cernlk and Smrkovsky, the
Soviets fe lt  the situation to be rapidly getting out of hand. Reports by
Czechoslovak conservatives such as Indra that "a counterrevolutionary
situation was in the making, leading to ai*rchy . . . and the destruction
13of the state” did not help matters. As July progressed, the situation 
had advanced to the point where anything relating to Czechoslovakia took 
precedence over concerns for detente or other major International events. 
It had reached a level of intensity su fficien t to warrant the constant 
scrutiny of the Soviet Politburo, signalling that along with Increased 
status came increased stress. Events during this period, the month of 
July, seemed to worsen daily for the Soviets. The Czechs' refusal to 
attend a Bloc meeting in Warsaw was something the Soviets found d if f icu lt  
to fathom. It upset the Soviet leadership greatly, as it  represented a 
change in Czech attitude and decreased Moscow's a b ility  to judge Czech 
actions. Pear of the unknown was now added.
Though the Politburo had begun to consider m ilitary Intervention 
as early as May, by July it  s t i l l  fe lt  that su ffic ien t pressure could be 
brought to bear through other means. A meeting in Warsaw on the 18th of 
a ll  the Bloc nations but Czechoslovakia and Rumania resulted in a strongly 
worded note called the Warsaw Letter. While it  represented the harshest
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warnings to date, the intent on the part of the Soviets was not only to 
warn Prague to mend its  ways, but also to ensure that the actions most 
Politburo members fe lt  were increasingly inevitable would be joint 
actions. Upon returning to Moscow the Politburo convened a plenum of the 
Central Committee, as usual, though the tone of Its resolution was quite 
d ifferent from the post-Dresden plenum in April. This time Czechoslovakia 
was ex p lic it ly  named and there was a ca ll for action based on "proletarian 
internationalism." This was a legitim ization o f Politburo views, views 
which began to encompass fewer and fewer alternatives to military action 
as time went by. By the 21st o f  July the decision had been made to Invade 
by August 26 (date of the Slovak Congress) unless the reform movement was 
e ffe ctiv e ly  ended. This decision was made by the Politburo, but had
evidently sprung from earlier decisions made at a most unusual
Politburo-Pretidium meeting. This would indicate that, "as the c r is is
escalated, the Politburo tended to increase the size of the decisional
1Aunit to ensure both fu ller participation and shared responsib ility ."
The severity of such a decision apparently stimulated the
non-interventionists to make one last attempt at a negotiated settlement. 
The risks involved in an Invasion, namely the p ossib ility  of resistance 
and the e ffe c t  on relations with the West, were s t i l l  great enough in the 
minds of some, such as Kosygin, to force the exhaustion of a l l  
alternatives before resorting to Invasion. Meetings were held at Clerna 
nad Tisou on the 29th of July and In Bratislava on August 3, the f ir s t  
b ila tera l and the second m ultilateral. These negotiations took place In 
an atmosphere of faint hopes for some and resignation for most. They 
managed only to provide a calm before the storm. It was In the Bratislava 
resolution that Brezhnev enunciated what was to become, after Its
application 17 days la ter , the "Brezhnev doctrine o f limited sovereignty." 
The period between Bratislava and the invasion was highlighted by the 
frantic e ffo r ts  o f the non-interventioni«ts to change the attitudes of 
Dubcek. While the decision  to invade was already being implemented, 
Dubcek appeared to have had no idea o f  what was about to happen. The 
le tters  o f warning sent by Brezhnev and the Politburo evidently affected  
him l i t t l e  or not at a l l .  Meanwhile, the c r is is  had reached its  peak t f  
Intensity, and the commencement o f the invasion on August 20 signaled the 
beginnings o f the p o s t-c r is is  period.
Throughout the c r is is  period a fa ir ly  large group of people had 
been Involved in deliberations. Despite the inclusion o f the Central 
Committee, the Presidium, and several key military figures, most major 
decisions were s t i l l  le f t  to the core group in the Politburo consisting of 
Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, Suslov and Shelest. The larger groups served 
mainly to aid in coa lition  building and responsibility  sharing. There was 
also an ever increasing need for data as the situation intensified , with 
more input coming from expanded contacts with various consultative groups, 
most notably other Cast European leaders. These heightened a c t iv it ie s  
began to wind down as the p ost-cr is is  period developed, but the fa ilures 
within the system were most dramatically evident at that stage.
The invasion went o f f  without a h itch , securing a l l  major points 
with only minor resistance. During post-invasion attempts to reconstitute 
the Czech government in Moscow's own image, however, everything went to 
p ieces. Moscow apparently believed that the reform movement in 
Czechoslovakia did not run deeply, and that people would be happy, i f  
given a chance, to support a new, anti-reform  government. This serious 
misjudgement resulted from the leadership's increased reliance on biased
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sources for information. The attempt to form a new government fa iled , and 
the Soviets were forced to deal with the old* The speed with which Moscow 
executed an about-face and released the ja iled  leaders so as to negotiate 
with them suggests that the Politburo had no back-up plans In case its  
hoped-for government failed  to materialise* This was due to both the lack 
o f accurate information and the urgency associated with the decision to 
invade* These are prime examples o f the negative e ffe cts  o f  stress on the 
decision-making process.
The levels o f c r is is , and consequently of stress* changed 
dramatically throughout the events o f  1968. There was no smooth 
progression from low to high levels , rather a series of peaks and valleys, 
denoting periods o f calm among periods o f alarm. The changes that can be 
noted in the decision-making process in Moscow can be attributed to these 
varying levels o f stress. The perceived need for informat io:; grew 
constantly, with less attention being paid to the sources and potential 
biases o f this information. The outside groups that provided the 
information also acted as independent consultative bodies, particularly 
the East Europeans and the m ilitary. Their role  was constant, but did not 
Increase sign ifican tly  during the c r is is . The same can be said of the 
major Soviet decisional forums. In fa ct, the role o f  most groups declined 
somewhat, as decisions became more centralised not only in the Politburo, 
but in the core group within that Politburo* This core group was 
responsible for most a c tiv it ie s  related to the c r is is  and used the other 
groups mainly as a too l for consensus-building* They were also a means 
for spreading the risks Involved in formulating any decision*
The Soviets were in many ways reacting to circumstances when 
making decisions relating to Chechoslovakia* There was an element o f risk
4 2
in most decisions, but because o f the nature o f  the rations concerned, 
these risks were never particularly large. The in it ia l  risk was that o f  
leaving the Czechs to their own designs, with the possible result that the 
reform bug would spread. This was the gravest threat perceived by the 
Soviets* and the entire c r is is  was an attempt to contain and* once the 
reform got out of hand, to n u llify  this threat. Other chances the Soviets 
took* particularly the invasion with the p oss ib ility  of resistance and 
adverse foreign reaction* were carefu lly  prepared for and deemed 
acceptable. Perceptions o f time threats may have aided in the acceptance 
o f  these risks* but on the whole did not serve to radicalize the study o f 
a lternatives. To the extent that the situation in Czechoslovakia was a 
cr is is*  the e ffe cts  of stress can be seen on the decision-making process. 
Yet overa ll, the system was able to absorb this stress, and with 
exceptions such as the post-invasion government fiasco* react 
successfu lly .
CONCLUSION
The study o f  decision-making processes end o f c r is is  behavior, end 
the interaction o f the two, can provide the analyst with key insights into 
the working of any sovereign state. A number o f different theories and 
paradigms have emerged for analysis, particularly in decision studies, 
forcing the observer to choose one or the other camp, though there is  
s t i l l  a great deal of room for adjustment. Despite the recent resurgence 
o f the analytical paradigm, with its  concurrent unitary and rational-actor 
components, in the writings of scholars such as Kenneth Waltz and Richard 
Kraaner, 1 believe that the best basis for the analysis undertaken in this 
work remains the bureaucratic-politics model with a ll  Its m odifications. 
No one model is  su ffic ien t to encompass a l l  aspects of foreign policy 
analysis. Having accepted one as a basis, however, others may be adopted 
as constraints on the orig in a l. Whereas the rational-actor model is  too 
narrow in and of i t s e l f ,  i t  works well in forcing some precision  on the 
more expansive bureaucratic-politics model. Within this model, the 
Dawlsha and A llison  versions complement one another, and in conjunction 
with the study o f c r is is  behavior serve as a suitable means for analysing 
Soviet in times o f c r is is .
The use o f only one case study in support of a hypothesis limits 
the application o f that hypothesis. Soviet activ ities Involving 
Csechoslovakia in 1968 do not necessarily speak for Soviet activ ities
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elsewhere, Hovuver, the events in Poland o f November 1981 to March 1982 
show a striking sim ilarity  to the events of the Prague Spring, Fears o f 
the directions which a broad-based reform movement would take led the 
Soviet Politburo under an a ilin g  Brezhnev to twice begin mobilisations for 
an invasion o f Poland. The success o f Jaruzelskl's crackdown obviated the 
need for armed intervention. This crackdown was successful in part
because o f the hyperawareness o f  the Poles and particularly o f Jaruselskl 
o f events in 1968 and the In itiation  o f invasion preparations by the
S oviets.*
Preliminary research by Richard D. Anderson Jr, suggests that much 
o f  the motivation for the handling o f Poland by the Soviets could be 
linked d irectly  to Politburo members' parochial interests. Just as in 
1968, the Politburo sp lit  into pro- and anti* nterventlonlats. The
pro-interventionists were led by "hard-line Party Ideologue M lfaail 
Sualov, supported by Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov. Brezhnev himself
led the argument agalnat invasions backed by Porelgn Minister Andrei
2Gromyko." The decisions to mobilize troops in preparation for invasion 
were set-backs for Brezhnev, who was under steady p o lit ica l  attack by 
Party Secretary Andrey Kirilenko. An invasion would have been a major 
set-back for Brezhnev's post-Afghanistan renewal o f  detente and would have 
highlighted hie in a b ility  to control events in the Warsaw Bloc, Anderson 
suggests that Brezhnev went so far as to reshuffle the leadership o f the
Ground Forces o f the Soviet Union (fiv e  of ten fron t-line positions were
changed in two months) in order to prevent preparations from moving ahead
3
too rapidly. Brezhnev made further e ffo r ts  by scheduling and publicising 
v is it s  with United States Foreign Relations Committee chair Senator 
Charles Farcy, who he knew would strongly warn against Invasion. Brezhnev
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succeeded in preventing an invasion, largely because of the meliorative 
e ffe c ts  c f  a conservative victory at the July Polish Party Congress andr
the success o f Jaruzelski's crackdown.
There are numerous differences between the recent events in Poland 
and earlier  events in Czechoslovakia. A major factor preventing a Soviet 
invasion vac the likelihood o f massive resistance by the Poles, a fear 
much less in evidence in the deliberations concerning Czechoslovakia. The 
awareness o f  the Polish leadership of a serious potential for Soviet 
action , unlike the foggy naivete of Dubcek, helped appease the hard-liners 
in the Soviet Politburo. Most Importantly, Brezhnev was able to maintain 
a su ffic ien t anti-interventionist coa lition , even i f  it  was sometimes as
4
small as one vote. At th is time the resemblances are strik ing, for a ll  
the aforementioned d ifferences. As further study of these events is  
conducted and more information becomes available, perhaps Poland w ill 
emerge as a situation more resembling Czechoslovakia in 1969* It is from 
these s im ila rities , and sim ilarities whic* an be drawn from Yugoslavia in 
1958, Hungary in 1956 and Afghanistan in 1979, that a general picture of 
Soviet decision-making and c r is is  behavior emerges.
The picture which we thus get is  not one of a monolithic unit 
relentlessly pursuing its national strategic interests in a deliberate and 
systematic fashion. Though this would perhaps appear the more comforting 
viewpoint to the layman, it  is  not borne out by the evidence presented. 
Most Americans have some idea of the give and take which makes up their 
own po litica l system; compromises between the various particular branches 
and special Interests involved make headlines daily. There is  a tendency, 
however, not to apply these same ideas when looking beyond one's own 
borders. This "us-’and’-them” mentality makes for hasty generalisations and
4 6
hasty reactions. One aspect o f  this work is  to demonstrate that there are 
certain sim ila rities  inherent in any large bureaucracy which a ffe ct its  
decision-making process.
Time and again the middle road appears better than any extreme. 
This Is particularly true for national decision-making analysis. On the 
continuum from rational actor to organizational process, totalitarianism  
to anarchy, the bureaucratic-politics model adopts a happy medium. It 
incorporates both the p o lit ic a l  muscle o f the individual leader and the 
systemic forces beyond the control o f any one person. A group of powerful 
individuals formulates policy on the basis not only o f national, but also 
o f  parochial and traditional Interests. This holds true not only for the 
American Secretary o f State defending his authority v is -a -v is  the National 
Security Advisor, but also the Soviet Minister o f  Foreign A ffa irs and the 
Minister of Defense.
Within the context of the model, certain trends emerge concerning 
Soviet actions and risk-taking propensities under duress. As the 
decision-making body is a co lle ct iv e  unit Involved in a bargaining 
process, there is  a tendency to expand the number o f consultants during a 
c r is is .  This in as much a function o f a p o lit ica l  desire for a broader 
base o f support for a particular viewpoint as i t  is  a search for more 
Inputs into the process. The central functional unit remains the 
Politburo. It may be constricted even further into a core group composed 
o f the leaders o f the various factions seeking support. The information 
that reaches th is  core group becomes a too l o f  the various sides, as a l l  
sides scramble for  people and aources which w ill  support their point o f 
view. As trad itional aources become lesa re liab le  in the heat o f a 
c r ia is , there la more room for  "new sources" which cannot he carefu lly
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scrutinized. The sense ot urgency which this implies, however, is  not 
meant to suggest that hasty decisions are being made. The Inherent 
caution o f  the leadership and its  co lle c t iv e  nature combine to insure that 
any decisions are the product of careful d e lib e ra t io n . There are no snap 
decisions; after lengthy and heated debate a decision is  reached and 
implemented, and a reaction awaited.
The Soviet Union must be more fu lly  understood in a ll  its  aspects 
i f  we are to deal with i t  successfu lly . Despite the apparently methodical 
approach which guides Its every move, the real process Is more complex. 
The common misconception o f the Soviet Union as a unitary actor inexorably 
marching towards an absolute goal fa lls  to take into account countless 
variables, including those sim ilarities between the Soviet and American 
bureaucracies which do ex is t. Inflated rhetoric suggesting that the 
Soviet Union is  the source o f a ll e v il  only perpetuates these fa lla c ie s  
and is  more dangerous than useful. While it  must be remembered that the 
Soviets have an exaggerated sense of need for security and that this makes 
them particu larly dangerous, considerations of Soviet perceptions and 
needs must not be treated in such a sim plistic manner. The Soviet Union 
needs to be watched carefu lly , yet watching implies more than ju st 
looking; most Important o f a l l ,  it  implies understanding.
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